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Abstract—Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks con-
tinue to be one of the most pernicious threats to the delivery of
services over the Internet. Not only are DDoS attacks present
in many guises, they are also continuously evolving as new
vulnerabilities are exploited. Hence accurate detection of these
attacks still remains a challenging problem and a necessity
for ensuring high-end network security. An intrinsic challenge
in addressing this problem is to effectively distinguish these
Denial-of-Service attacks from similar looking Flash Events (FEs)
created by legitimate clients. A considerable overlap between the
general characteristics of FEs and DDoS attacks makes it difficult
to precisely separate these two classes of Internet activity. In this
paper we propose parameters which can be used to explicitly
distinguish FEs from DDoS attacks and analyse two real-world
publicly available datasets to validate our proposal. Our analysis
shows that even though FEs appear very similar to DDoS attacks,
there are several subtle dissimilarities which can be exploited to
separate these two classes of events.
Keywords—Distributed Denial-of-service (DDoS); Network Se-
curity; Flash Event; Botnet
I. INTRODUCTION
Even decades after the first full-scale DoS attack in the
form of high-rate flooding was unleashed [1], these attacks in
various modes still continue to constitute a pernicious threat
within the Internet domain [2]. A DoS attack is a malicious
attempt by the attacker to make computing resources or ser-
vices unavailable to intended clients. One form of this attack
in which an array of geographically spread compromised
machines (aka bots, zombies, agents, etc.) is controlled by the
bot-master and used against some target host(s) to cause DoS
is called Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack [3]. A
set of these compromised machines or bots is called a Botnet.
A majority of DDoS attacks attempt to bring down the
victim host or server by consuming most of its available
bandwidth or other computing resources like memory, CPU
etc. Some of these attacks use IP spoofing to conceal the
attacker’s identity while some use genuine IP addresses of
the compromised machines. The former attack methods are
relatively easier to detect as compared to the latter in which
the request or attack packets look very similar (or may even
be crafted) to the ones send by legitimate users.
An early 1970’s short science fiction story defined Flash
Crowd as the situation when thousands of people went back
in time to see historical events again [4]. In today’s online
world, the term Flash Event (FE) is used to describe a similar
situation when tens and thousands of valid users concurrently
access a computing resource. This sudden burst of legitimate
traffic is often due to a newsworthy sports event like the
Olympics or new product release by companies like Apple,
Microsoft etc. Victoria’s Secret [5] webcast is one of the
popular examples of a FE.
Sometimes, the occurrence of such events is known well in
advance like a product release by Apple. These events can
be termed as predictable flash events. However, there can
be situations when the web servers do not have any prior
knowledge and are not expecting a traffic surge. Such events
can be labeled as unpredictable flash events. Some examples
can be news and medical web servers experiencing high traffic
after a natural disaster (floods, earthquakes) or a terrorist attack
(9/11), or the onset of an epidemic (e.g. swine flu) respectively.
The Slashdot Effect or Slashdotting is another type of FE when
popular websites like Slashdot, Digg etc. comprise references
or links to other websites, thereby causing a massive increase
to their incoming traffic. If the referenced links are less
well provisioned, the traffic could easily exceed the available
bandwidth and render the site temporarily unreachable.
Notwithstanding the amount of research done in the past
decade, accurate detection of Denial-of-Service attacks contin-
ues to remain a difficult problem. FEs make this problem even
more difficult to solve by sharing many similar characteristics
[6]. Both DDoS attacks and FEs represent anomalies in the
Internet traffic causing overloading of servers and rendering
them less responsive. From the network administrators point
of view, a precise distinction between DDoS attacks and FEs
is very important because these events require an entirely
different set of actions to be undertaken after they have been
sucessfully identified. Detection of a FE requires an increase
in the number of CDN’s (Content Distribution Networks)
and various load sharing mechanisms to accommodate more
legitimate users [6]. Whereas, in case of DDoS attack, the
network administrator would like to enable various attack
mitigation mechanisms to filter out the maliciuos traffic and
continue uninterrupted access to the legitimate clients.
In this paper, we seek to identify a set of parameters
which can differentiate a real-world DDoS attack from an FE.
Subsequently, we perform a detailed analysis of two publically
available datasets representing a real-world DDoS attack and a
FE to verify our approach. The datasets used for this purpose
are the CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007” Dataset [7] and the
“1998 FIFA World Cup” Dataset [8], a DDoS attack and an
FE respectively. The CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007” Dataset
(referred to as CAIDA in the rest of the paper) contains one
hour of anonymised traffic from a DDoS attack that occured on
August 4, 2007. The “1998 FIFA World Cup” Dataset (referred
to as World Cup in the rest of the paper) contains one way
traffic from anonymized sources to 33 different web servers
for a 92 day period from April 30, 1998 to July 26, 1998.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
gives an overview of recent relevant work in the field of DDoS
attack detection and its differentiation from FEs. Section
3 describes the two datasets used to validate the proposed
distinguishing parameters. Section 4 describes our proposed
parameters which can separate the aforementioned events.
Section 5 presents the experimentation and evaluation results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and summarizes the research and
presents future directions of research in this area.
II. RELATED WORK
Accurate detection of DDoS attacks remains a tough chal-
lenge. Attackers mimicing normal Internet traffic further ex-
acerbates the problem. DDoS detection has predominantly
followed two broad directions: network traffic analysis and
MIB (Management Information Base) data analysis.
The network traffic analysis method uses various theshold
based techniques like observing the total traffic coming in and
going out of an edge router [9], and counting the number of
packets in a given time frame [10]. TCP/IP header analysis like
ratio of incoming and outgoing packets [11], IP flow analysis
[12], entropy detection [13], activity profiling [14] are some
of the other techniques used. Peng et al. [15] used history
based source IP address filtering at an edge router to detect
DDoS attack. The proposed mechanism maintains a historical
database of all the valid IP addresses i.e. those completing the
three-way TCP handshake. The database is updated using a
sliding window in order to store the most recent IP addresses.
Whenever the edge router gets overloaded, the IP Address
Database (IAD) is used to decide whether to accept the in-
coming packets. During an attack, only the packets originating
from source IP addresses present in the database are allowed
access. However, the IAD can be corrupted by those source
IP addresses which first complete a three-way handshake and
later on participate in the attack. A similar work done by Ejaz
et al. [16] uses rate of arrival of new source IP addresses in
combination with the change point analysis technique to detect
the occurrence of a DDoS attack.
The second area for DDoS detection that has evolved over
past few years has been statistical analysis of MIB (Man-
agement Information Base) data collected via SNMP agents.
This integrates existing detection systems (like an Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs)) with SNMP-based Network Man-
agement Systems (NMSs) to detect the onset of a DDoS attack
[17] based on server load or memory utilisation. Bao [18] and
Yu [19] proposed a fast, lightweight, hierarchical SVM based
DDoS attack detection mechanism. The proposed mechanism
could efficiently detect both known and novel attacks. It is
based on analyzing the security status of the network by using
the MIB data gathered by the SNMP agents. The proposed
mechanism can distinguish attack traffic from normal traffic
and characterize the attack data as TCP-SYN flood, UDP flood
and ICMP flood. The results obtained from analyzing MIB
data in conjunction with IDSs were comparable to results
achieved by analyzing the traffic data.
There are potentially a few techniques for differentiating
bots and humans which could be applied for separating the two
class of events in which we are interested viz. DDoS attacks
and FEs. Amongst all available techniques, CAPTCHAs [20]
have been heavily used. CAPTCHAs are graphical puzzles
designed on the premise that humans can solve them but
machines or bots cannot. Kandula et. al [21] used these
puzzles to build a system based on probabilistic authentication
to protect a web server. However, the use of such puzzles
introduces additional delays for legitimate clients. These grahi-
cal puzzles were effective until puzzle-breaking mechanisms
were developed which made it possible for compromised
machines or bots to break the visual CAPTCHAs using various
automated methods [22].
In some recent work on distinguishing DDoS from FE,
Hyund et al. have reported the use of randomness checking
[23]. In both [23] and [6], the number of incoming requests
increases dramatically both in case of a DDoS attack and an
FE. Both [23] and [6] are based on datasets of predictable FEs
not available in the public domain. The World Cup dataset
used in our work described in this paper shows that even in
case of a predictable flash event it can take some time for the
FE traffic to build up and the intensification in the incoming
network traffic to the victim can be gradual rather than abrupt.
The author conjectures that in case of an unpredictable flash
event this parameter might behave differently still. The lack of
datasets representing FEs, both predictable and unpredicted,
contributes to such speculation. One of the future works of
the conducted research is to attempt a classification of various
types of flash events.
Yi et al. [24] suggested a novel hidden semi-Markov based
anomaly detector for detecting shrew HTTP flood attacks
from Flash Crowds. A Shrew HTTP flood attack is a type
of application level DDoS attack which is a combination of
a shrew attack and HTTP flood. A shrew attack is a low-rate
DoS attack which sends “legitimate appearing” requests at a
sufficiently low rate to elude detection by counter DoS tech-
niques [25]. Their proposed technique used Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) to abstract the multivariate observation vector. However,
their proposed scheme was unable to differentiate and separate
the malicious sources from legitimate. Thus it only served as
an alert function to more complex monitoring mechanisms.
The mechanism proposed by Le et al. [26] can only be used
to distinguish FE from spoofed DoS attacks. Yu et al. [27]
proposed a technique to distinguish between a DDoS attack
and Flash Crowd based on flow similarity. They define flow
as the packets which are passing through the same router and
have a common destination address. Their technique is based
on the premise that there is a stronger similarity between the
flows of a DDoS attack as compared to those in flash crowds.
They used three abstract distance metrics (Abstract distance,
Jeffrey distance and Sibon distance) to measure and compare
the flow similarity among DDoS and flash crowd flows based
on the parameter viz. number of packets (presumably packets
per flow). Their research shows that Sibon distance is the
most suitable metric to measure the flow similarity. When
tested on real-datasets, the proposed algorithm produced a
differentiating accuracy of around 65%. In this paper a detailed
analysis of two real world datasets has resulted in identification
of additional parameters (see IV) that can be used to effectively
differentiate between FE and DDoS.
III. DATASETS
The research conducted is validated using two real-world
network traffic traces. Each of the traces used in this research
is available in the public domain and contains information
relating to time and pseudonymized source and destination IP
addresses.
For a real-world DDoS attack, we used the CAIDA
“DDoS Attack 2007” Dataset [7]. This dataset contains
pseudonymized traces from a DDoS attack that occurred on
August 4, 2007 for approximately an hour (20:50:08 UTC
to 21:56:16). The attack represents a DoS attack where the
attacking sources try to consume all of the available network-
ing and the computing resources of a target host by sending
huge amount of access requests. The dataset contains the
attack traces to the victim and its responses. The traffic traces
have been pseudonymized using CryptoPAn prefix-preserving
pseudonymization using single key and the payloads have been
zeroed.
The “1998 FIFA World Cup” Dataset [8], provided by the
Internet Traffic Archive, is the FE dataset used in our work.
This dataset contains all the requests made to the 1998 FIFA
World Cup websites during a period of 92 days (April 30,
1998 to July 26, 1998). During this period, there were 33
different web servers hosting information related to the World
Cup. These servers were located at four different geographical
locations: Paris (France), Plano (Texas), Herndon (Virginia)
and Santa Clara (California). The time on each server was
synchronized with the local time in France (GMT + 0200),
which was the host country. The source IP addresses in the
traffic traces have been replaced by unique integer identifiers
which are preserved throughout the dataset. To ensure privacy,
the mapping file for the source IP address pseudonymization
is not publicly available. Table I summarizes the macro-level
statistics of the two datasets used in this research.
Table I
MACRO-LEVEL STATISTICS OF CAIDA AND WORLD CUP DATASETS
Parameters CAIDA World Cup
File format pcap common log format
Packet/Request type ICMP ECHO HTTP GET
Number of target(s) 1 33
Activity type DDoS attack FE
Total number of packets
sent 359,655,826 1,352,804,107
Total duration 66 min 92 days
Total capture size
(uncompressed) 5.3 GB 8.1 GB
IV. PARAMTERIZING DDOS ATTACKS AND FLASH EVENTS
The term DDoS is often used interchangeably with high-
rate flooding attacks. Common examples of DDoS or high-
rate flooding attacks are TCP SYN flooding and HTTP GET
request flooding. A Flash Event (FE) is a sudden surge in
incoming traffic to a web site, thereby rendering it over-loaded
and congesting the network links leading to it. These FEs
are caused by legitimate clients as compared to DDoS attacks
which are carried out by compromised machines. The DDoS
attacks can be crafted to look very similar to FEs, only intent
separates them and not the content. However, this criterion
does not help in differentiating between these two events. In
order to exploit the behavioral differences between these two
class of events, we propose the following parameters. The
parameters while not completely orthogonal capture different
aspects of the traffic.
A. Change in Rate of Incoming Traffic
In DDoS attacks, the attacking machines or bots are often
infected by malware which is programmed to send packets at
a pre-defined rate. In order to cause the maximum damage, the
bot-master triggers the compromised machines simultaneously.
On receiving commands from the bot-master, the bots start
sending huge amounts of data. Hence, the victim server often
experiences a sudden burst in incoming traffic over a relatively
short period of time. This unexpected surge causes the server
to exceed its maximum pre-defined sustainable limits, thereby
slowing it down considerably and in some cases forcing it to
shut down. In contrast to this, whenever a newsworthy event
occurs triggering a FE, it is highly unlikely that the entire
web user community is simultaneously informed. Instead, it
takes times for the news to spread among people. Therefore,
the incoming traffic to the web server gradually increases over
time before hitting a maximum. Hence, it should be possible
to use the difference in the rates of incoming traffic can be
used to differentiate DDoS and FE.
B. Change in Rate of New Source IP Addresses
DDoS attacks are usually carried out by a finite set of
compromised machines also known as a Botnet. Recent studies
conducted on Botnets defines two terms related to their size:
the Botnet’s footprint and its live population [28]. A Botnet’s
footprint is the total number of infected machines at any point
in the Botnet’s lifetime. A Botnet’s live population is the
number of bots which are live or active at the same time
in a Command and Control (C&C) channel1. Rajab et al.
[28] estimated that even though the footprints of the Botnets
tracked by them went as high as several tens of thousands,
their effective size i.e. the live population at any given point
in their lifetime was usually limited to a few thousands. On
the other hand, the number of web users accessing a popular
website to get the information related to a special event is
substantially greater than the number of distinct bots. This
forms the basis of another proposed parameter.
In case of a DDoS attack, as the bots are triggered si-
multaneously, the victim host experiences a large number of
new (not seen previously) source IP addresses at the start of
the attack. Due to a relatively smaller set of compromised
machines, the attacker uses nearly the same set of sources
during the course of the attack. In other words, after a DDoS
attack starts, the victim host sees very few new source IP
addresses sending packets to it. But in case of FEs, as the
information travels through the web community, more and
more new users come online to access it. Hence, the web
server constantly observes new source IP addresses. Therefore,
the rate of new source IP addresses as seen by the target can
be used as one of the parametric differences between DDoS
and FE.
C. Distribution of Requests Among Source IP Addresses
In case of a DDoS attack, as the attacker has control over
a limited number of compromised machines it tries to achieve
the desired maximum load by forcing each bot to send large
number of requests. Hence, the sudden surge in incoming
traffic to the victim is mainly attributed to a high number of
requests per source IP address.
In contrast to this, during a FE, the majority of the clients
are interested only in some specific information, hence a rela-
tively small number of requests originate from each accessing
client. Therefore, the excess load that the server experiences
in a FE is mainly due to clients with a considerably smaller
request per client rate as compared to a DDoS attack.
Summary
These three parameters viz. Rate of Incoming Traffic, Rate
of New Source IP Addresses, and Distribution of Requests
Among Source IP Addresses indicate the possibility of distin-
guishing a real-world DDoS attack from a FE. The following
section presents the experiments conducted on the two publicly
available datasets. It also provides an in-depth evaluation of
our results.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION
The parameters proposed for distinguishing between DDoS
and FE in the above section are investigated and verified by the
analysis of two datasets viz. CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007” and
1The botmaster takes control over the bots and issues commands often using
an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server or a particular channel on a public IRC
server. This server is also known as C&C server and the channel is known as
C&C channel.
60000
600000
6000000
60000000
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65
N
um
be
r o
f p
ac
ke
ts
Time (in mins)
Figure 1. CAIDA traffic profile.
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Figure 2. World Cup traffic profile.
“1998 FIFA World Cup”. In addition to the statistics provided
in Table I, the overall traffic profile for the two datasets is
shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
Fig. 1 shows the CAIDA DDoS attack where after the initial
25 minutes, the packet rate abruptly jumps and attains the
maximum. This maximum is held for the remainder of the
attack period.
Fig. 2 shows the access request pattern during the World
Cup, including a few days before and after the completion of
the event. The presence of various peaks in the traffic profile
indicate the occurrence of separate FEs during the course of
this 92 day period.
A. Change in Rate of Incoming Traffic
This section discusses the rate at which the incoming traffic
appears at the server or victim host in the two cases i.e. FE and
DDoS attack. The number of requests or packets in both cases
is considerably greater than in the normal situation i.e. non FE
and non DDoS duration. Our focus is on analyzing the manner
in which these incoming requests or packets increase in both
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Figure 3. World Cup traffic profile during semi-final matches.
cases. In order to achieve this we compare the increasing part
of the peaks for the two events. For DDoS this represented
the ten minute period from 25 - 35 mins (Fig. 1). And in case
of FE the selected interval was a two hour interval (46thand
47th hours) during the semi-final matches of the World Cup
i.e. 73rdand 74th day. Fig. 3 shows the traffic pattern during
these two days.
In a DDoS attack, the compromised machines or bots are
infected using malware which is pre-programmed to make
these machines send packets at a fixed rate. Upon receiving
the commands from the bot-master, all of these compromised
machines simultaneously start sending large number of packets
to the intended target. This causes the incoming traffic at the
target machine to abruptly increase in a very short time interval
and hence causes the rate of incoming traffic to increase
drastically. Fig. 4 shows this trend in the DDoS attack. In
Fig. 4 the sudden decrease in the number of incoming packets
at time 210 seconds and 480 seconds can be due to the
measurement frequency (30 seconds) used in this analysis. The
nature of the data and lack of additional information makes it
difficult to identify the exact cause of such behavior.
In contrast to the DDoS attack, in case of a FE, it is very
unlikely that the entire web user community starts accessing
the web server to get the information at precisely the same
time. Consequently, the incoming packet rate to the server
host will be more steady. Fig. 5 shows the rate of incoming
traffic in case of FE.
The clear difference in the slopes for two traffic profiles
suggests that this can be used as a distinguishable parameter
to separate a real-world DDoS attack from a FE.
B. Change in Rate of New Source IP Addresses
This section presents the analysis of the rate of increase of
new source IP addresses as a characteristic feature which can
differentiate between a DDoS and FE. As discussed earlier, in
cases of DDoS attacks, the attacker has control over a finite
set of compromised machines. Activation of the bots produces
a gigantic traffic load on the target host coming from a set
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Figure 4. DDoS attack profile (10 minute period).
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Figure 5. FE profile (120 minute period).
of sources which have not been previously seen. Therefore,
it produces a sharp increase in the new source IP addresses
synchronized with the onset of the DDoS attack. This limited
set of compromised machines are iteratively used during the
attack to produce the desired effect. In other words, this means
that once the attack starts, the target host rarely sees any
further increment in the new source IP addresses. Rather it
experiences more packets from the same set of IPs.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 supports this conjecture with the new
IP addresses suddenly increasing with the onset of the DDoS
attack and remaining fairly low and constant for the rest of
the attack period. For analyzing the rate of new source IP
addresses we performed experiments using different window
sizes as the history period including a five minute and one
minute window size. For each window size we have calculated
the number of new source IP addresses and compared it with
the history period i.e. previous five minute and one minute
interval respectively.
On the contrary, during a FE the web server sees a rela-
tively constant or slowly increasing rate of new IP addresses,
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Figure 6. New source IP addresses with five minute history period (DDoS).
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Figure 7. New source IP addresses with one minute history period (DDoS).
considerably different from the DDoS attack. Fig. 8 shows
that apart from the initial five minutes, the number of new
sources accessing the server remains fairly constant. For a
one minute history period (Fig. 9), the number of new IP
addresses increases gradually but it is still different from the
DDoS attack where it is more abrupt. Hence, this feature can
be used to distinguish between these two class of events.
Rate of arrival of new source IP addresses using the change-
point analysis has been used in our previous work to detect
the onset of a DDoS attack [16]. There was no attempt in that
work to distinguish DDoS attacks from FEs. Using a proof
of concept implementation, our research demonstrated how a
simple network traffic parameter like new source IP address
is sufficient to effectively detect flooding attacks.
C. Distribution of Requests Among Source IP Addresses
For the observation period of these two events i.e. ten
minutes for DDoS and two hours for FE, the statistical analysis
showed a significant difference in the values of parameters like
number of unique IPs, average number of requests per IP etc.
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Figure 8. New source IP addresses with five minute history period (FE).
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Figure 9. New source IP addresses with one minute history period (FE).
Table II provides a micro-level statistics for the two events
during the observation period.
In case of a FE, apart from some regular or frequent users,
most are concerned with a very limited and specific piece of
information related to the event. Thus, a majority of clients
appeared to have a very low request per IP values. The
overloading of servers in FE is mainly caused by an increase in
Table II
MICRO-LEVEL STATISTICS OF CAIDA AND WORLD CUP DATASETS
Parameters World Cup CAIDA
Observation time 2 hours 10 mins
Number of
Requests/Packets 15,698,000 74,478,486
Number of unique source
IPs 41,566 8,585
Average number of
requests per IP (Mean) 377.66 8675.42
Standard deviation 958.99 7737.87
Coefficient of variation
(CV) 2.53 0.89
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Figure 10. Requests per source IP distribution.
the number of clients rather than requests per client. Hence,
in case of a FE there are more clients generating very few
requests as compared to a DDoS attack where the requests
are more uniformly spread across the clients. This behavior is
seen to be consistent with the values of coefficient of variation
(CV) in both the cases. The value of CV greater than one
(as in case of FE) indicates an Erlang Distribution whereas a
value less than one (as in case of DDoS) implies an Hyper-
exponential Distribution as shows in Fig. 10. It compares the
distribution of requests among the source IP addresses in terms
of the percentage of total outgoing traffic contributed by each
source IP.
Fig. 10 shows that in case of the FE 90% of the total clients
contribute less than 10% of the total outgoing traffic which is
distinctly different from DDoS attack where the distribution of
traffic is more uniform amongst the source IP addresses. Thus,
the distribution of requests per source IP distinctly separates
the two class of events.
An important observation made from this particular analysis
is that the majority of traffic in case of a FE is generated by a
small percentage of the overall participating clients, less than
10% in this case. The source IPs sending large number of
requests are suspected to be a cluster of network proxies hiding
a large number of private source IPs behind a comparatively
small set of public IPs as seen by the target host. Another
possible explanation could be the presence of web-crawlers or
web-spiders which often send very large number of requests
within a short time interval.
One of the differences between a proxy and a client as
pointed out by Krishnamurthy et.al [29] is the think time. A
proxy has a lower think time than a client and hence it issues
more number of requests per time as compared to a client. In
other words, the inter-arrival-time (IAT) for packets coming
from proxy is less and fairly constant as compared to packets
coming from clients which have a large and variable think time.
This behavioral difference is shown by Fig. 11 which compares
this packet inter-arrival-time for a proxy i.e. source IP sending
large number of requests and a client i.e. source IP sending
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Figure 12. Requests per source IP distribution for normal traffic.
small number of requests. We conjecture that the evolution of
botnet behavior to mimic the variable IATs characteristic of
FEs is just around the corner and presents a significant danger
to successful use of IATs to differentiate botnet traffic from
FEs. We expect in future work to explore both this imminent
threat and possible counter-measures based around identifying
IAT distributions per IP. This is of course complicated further
by the point noted above regarding a small number of set of
public IPs as seen by the target host hiding a large number of
private source IPs.
This led us to analyze the non-attack (first 25 minutes)
traffic of the CAIDA dataset. Fig. 12 shows the distribution
of outgoing traffic among the clients in case of normal traffic
which looks very similar to the one observed in FE. However,
the total number of unique sources responsible for the normal
traffic (183) is very small as compared to the ones responsible
for FEs (8585).
We see how the distribution of outgoing requests among the
sources is noticeably different in DDoS attacks and FEs.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
DDoS attacks have been one of the most destructive modes
of attack in the last decade. FEs share significant characteris-
tics with DDoS attacks and this aggravates the existing prob-
lem of how to identify DDoS attacks. The research presented
in this paper attempts to provide a solution by exposing some
subtle differences between these two network anomalies. This
paper proposes a set of parameters (Change in Rate of Incom-
ing Traffic, Change in Rate of New Source IP Addresses, and
Distribution of Requests Among Source IP Addresses) which
can be used to efficiently differentiate between DDoS attacks
and FEs. It also provides a comprehensive analysis of two real-
world publicly available datasets viz. CAIDA “DDoS Attack
2007” and “1998 FIFA World Cup”, representing a DDoS
attack and a FE respectively to validate our approach. It is
acknowledged that there are marked dissimilarities between
these two datasets. One of the future works of this research
is to evaluate the proposed parameters on different dataset
examples, datasets that are not so markedly dissimilar. This
work would also attempt to classify different types of FEs.
The future work will also attempt to identify additional pa-
rameters like IAT distribution per IP, geographical location of
source IP addresses etc. and use them along-with the existing
parameters to build a distinguishing function to tell apart these
two network traffic anomalies viz. DDoS attack and FE. We
also expect to explore and provide a possible counter-measure
to the evolution of DDoS attacks imitating the characteristic
behavior of FEs e.g. a DDoS attack with a variable or random
packet-rate. In addition we seek to investigate how can this
parametrization of datasets be used to synthetically generate
the network traffic closely approximating a DDoS attack and
FE.
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